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INTRODUCTION

We take language for granted in our daily existence. Not surprisingly, then, a clear legal recognition of the right to use a language
other than English does not exist in this country. This, in part,
reflects our failure to think through whether and why we might
choose to respect language differences among citizens. In a country of
immigrants, this question is particularly compelling because, to a people, language evokes an entire range of experience; this experience
can be either immensely satisfying and comforting or, if externally
imposed, threatening and forbidding.'
One's national origin almost invariably dictates one's choice of
language for personal conversations. Thus, where language is externally imposed in the form of English-only rules in the workplace,
1. See, e.g., P. VAN DEN BERGHE, THE ETHNIC PHENOMENON 34 (1981). van den
Berghe states:
The first language learned in infancy is intimately associated with a whole
register of emotions first experienced with close kinsmen and, therefore, these
affective of kinship become associated with language and rub off onto other
members of the speech community. The spontaneous joy of hearing one's
mother tongue spoken when surrounded by strangers is probably a universal
human experience.... Language learning is the universal human experience of
early childhood through which full human sociality is achieved, and through
which one becomes integrated in a kinship network.
Id.
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there exists a nexus between the institution of such employment practices and national origin discrimination. Gutierrez v. Municipal
Court, decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, is a microcosm of the legal, political, and social forces currently competing in the arena of national origin employment discrimination law. It has received a considerable amount of attention
because it is one of the first cases in the nation (and the first in California) to address the validity of English-only rules. 3 Especially noteworthy is the role that the English Language Amendment movement'
plays in Gutierrez, reflecting the popular attitudes toward Spanishspeaking people and the degree of hostility exhibited toward that
group's development.5 The question of what authority an employer
has to address language-related tensions in the workplace is one of
2. 838 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir.), reh'g denied, 861 F.2d 1187 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. granted and
judgment vacated, 109 S. Ct. 1736 (1989).
In this case, the judges of a Los Angeles municipal court deemed it necessary to employ a
staff of bilingual court clerks to service the mostly Hispanic population. In reaction to the
significant amount of Spanish being spoken in the courtroom, the judges instituted an Englishonly rule in the workplace. Id. at 1036, 1044. The rule mandated that all personal
conversations among the employees be conducted in English; it was to the clerks' official,
judicial duties to which this rule did not apply, for obvious reasons. The defendant judges
turned to California's state constitution for support, where they referred to the amendment
declaring English the official language of the state. See CAL. CONST. art. III, § 6. Because the
conversations that take place in a courtroom are official, they contended, such exchanges
should be conducted in English. Gutierrez, 838 F.2d at 1044. To make this assertion,
however, the defendant judges had to ignore their previous differentiation between "official"
conversations and "personal" ones. Id. The Ninth Circuit struck down the rule as violative of
Title VII. Id. at 1045.
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari, but dismissed the appeal as
moot because the plaintiff lacked standing. 109 S. Ct. 1736 (1989).
3. See Cox, "English Only"Means Little, Court Rules, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 8, 1988, at 17, col.
1; Carrizosa, Muni Court's Rule Banning Spanish Held Discriminatory, Los Angeles Daily J.,
Jan. 28, 1988, at 1, col. 2.
4. Founded by former Senator Samuel Ichiye Hayakawa from California, the movement's
initial goal was to pass an amendment to the United States Constitution, declaring English the
official language of the country. Alter, English Spoken Here, Please, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 9,
1984, at 24; Ehrlich, Should English-Only Be the Law of the Land?, Bus. WK., Nov. 10, 1986,
at 116. See generally Samuel I Hayakawa: An English-Only Crusade, MACLEANS, Oct. 8,
1984, at 8, 10. Although the amendment did not pass at the federal level, the movement has
gathered substantial momentum and similar amendments have passed at the state level in 17
states to date. See infra note 122 and accompanying text.
5. If a particular ethnic group has been viewed in some way as irreconcilably alien to the
prevailing concept of American culture (usually because of race, color, and/or religion), the
United States has traditionally imposed harsh restrictions on its language practices; if not so
viewed, use of the foreign language has gone largely unquestioned or was even encouraged.
See Leibowicz, The Proposed English Language Amendment: Shield or Sword?, 3 YALE L. &
POL'Y REv. 519, 533-39 (1985).
There was little controversy over multilingualism in the United States until the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries when there was a sharp increase in the number of
European immigrants and nativism emerged as a powerful social force. Id.
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exceptional importance. As sad experience has shown elsewhere, language can be a potent source of racial and ethnic discrimination, exacerbating geographic, cultural, religious, ethnic, and class divisions.6
To have this type of friction played out in the workplace can be highly
detrimental and counterproductive.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discriminatory
employment practices on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.7 Whether a bilingual employee may speak a language
other than English while on the job, then, is an employment discrimination issue based upon the national origin category.' Establishing
English-only rules at the workplace, however, has been viewed as an
employer's prerogative-a decision that should be left to his discretion. 9 Proponents of English-only rules argue that an employer
should be free to require his employees to communicate in English for
6. One example is the long-standing division between the French-speaking Walloons and
the Flemish-speaking population of Belgium, a country where language conflicts have been
especially bitter because they are heavily overlaid with class conflicts. See, e.g., P. VAN DEN
BERGHE, supra note 1, at 197-205. The "language demands" in many regions of India also
reflect linguistic and ethnic divisions. See Das Gupta, Ethnicity, Language Demands and
NationalDevelopment in India, in ETHNICITY: THEORY AND EXPERIENCE 466 (N. Glazer &
D. Moynihan eds. 1975). The separatist movements by the Corsicans of France, the Basques
of Spain, the Tamils of Sri Lanka, the Kurds of Turkey and Iraq, and the Sikhs of India have
all been reinforced and, to varying degrees, influenced by linguistic differences. See generally
D. HoRowrrz, ETHNIC GROUPS INCONFLICT (1985). In Canada, for example, French- and
English-speaking citizens exhibit a bitter mutual resistance towards one another's language
that has taken on the characteristics of a racial confrontation. See Porter, Ethnic Pluralismin
CanadianPerspective, in ETHNICrrY: THEORY AND EXPERIENCE, supra, at 268.

7. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988).
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin ....
8. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) first protected language
rights at the workplace under the "national origin" category. See 29 C.F.R. § 1606 (1988).
Courts agree with this interpretation. See, e.g., Jones v. United Gas Improvement Corp., 68
F.R.D. 1, 8 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (Discrimination against individuals, solely because of a Spanishspeaking background, was deemed to clearly fall within the national origin category proscribed
by Title VII.); see also Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 88 (1973) (As used in Title
VII, the term "national origin" refers to "the country where a person was born, or, more
broadly, the country from which his or her ancestors came."). For a critique of this use of the
national origin category, see Piat, Toward Domestic Recognition of a Human Right to
Language, 23 Hous. L. Rv. 885, 901 (1986).
9. Former Senator Samuel I. Hayakawa, founder of the Washington, D.C.-based
organization, U.S. English, argues: "When groups of Hispanics and Chinese who can speak
English don't, it automatically divides employees into factions. If the top man in a firm thinks
[speaking languages other than English] is dividing his staff, he has every right to say that at
work employees must speak English." Minor, Communication Conflict: English-Only Rules
Enter the Workplace, Los Angeles Daily J., Sept. 27, 1988, at 1, col. 3.
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fear that the workplace may turn into a "Tower of Babel. '" They
contend that such rules protect the employer's property interest in the
business by ensuring that monolingual customers and/or coworkers

will not be offended by the use of another language in their presence. I

By contrast, English-only rules also have been characterized as a

"burdensome term and condition of employment,"' 2 presumed to be
discriminatory. Foes of such rules in the workplace maintain that
"irritation" by monolingual customers or other third parties is an
insufficient justification for the imposition of the majority language on
bilingual (or multilingual) employees.'

3

There are contradicting lines of authority on the illusive right to
speak the language of one's choosing in the contexts where litigants

have sought to assert it, such as in the workplace.' 4 The procedural
systems of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act authorize the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC" or "Commission")
to process complaints of discriminatory employment practices and,
5
when necessary, to file suits against defendants in federal court.'
Traditionally, decisions by the EEOC have protected language rights
against English-only rules at the workplace under the "national origin" category of Title VII,I6 and courts have agreed that this category

affords such protection.

7

The scope of the freedom to use a language

10. See Gutierrez v. Municipal Court, 838 F.2d 1031, 1042 (9th Cir. 1988).
11. Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 267 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 625 F.2d 1016 (5th Cir.
1980), cert denied, 449 U.S. 1113 (1981).
12. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7 (1988).
13. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Erlenbusch, 368 F. Supp. 752, 755-56 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (stating
that a rule prohibiting speaking Spanish at the bar so as not to antagonize English-speaking
beer drinkers violated Spanish-speakers' civil rights); cf Diaz v. Pan American World
Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971) (customer
preference for female flight attendants insufficient justification for refusal to hire men for same
jobs).
14. Several scholarly articles have addressed and advocated aspects of a right to use or
receive communications in a language other than English in other contexts. See, e.g., Avila,
Equal Educational Opportunities for Language Minority Children, 55 U. CoLO. L. REv. 559
(1984); Groisser, A Right to Translation Assistance in Administrative Proceedings, 16 COLUM.
J.L. & Soc. PROmS. 469 (1981).
15. Exec. Order No. 12067, 43 F.R. 28967 (1978), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988).
16. See EEOC Dec. 72-0281 (Aug. 9, 1971) (employer's rule prohibiting Spanishsurnamed Americans from speaking their native tongue while employed as barbers operated to
deny them a privilege of employment enjoyed by Anglos and thus discriminated against them
as a class on the basis of national origin); see also EEOC Dec. 71-446, 2 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 1127 (Nov. 5, 1970) (employer's rule prohibiting Spanish language communications
among employees held violative of Title VII). Decisions by the EEOC on complaints of
employment discrimination are referred to by numbers rather than name because Title VII
bars identification of the parties to the proceedings before the Commission.
17. See Carino v. University of Okla. Bd. of Regents, 750 F.2d 815, 819 (10th Cir. 1984);
Saucedo v. Brothers Well Serv. Inc., 464 F. Supp. 919, 920 (S.D. Tex. 1979). Courts have also
recognized that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 may provide a parallel remedy to the Equal Employment

19901

ENGLISH-ONL Y RULES

.1213

other than English on the job, however, became questionable beginning in 1980. First, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit upheld the discharge of a bilingual store clerk in Garcia v.
Gloor,"8 based on the clerk's violation of an English-only rule instituted by his employer.' 9 Then, shortly after Garcia,the EEOC issued
its Guidelines on National Origin Discrimination ("Guidelines"),2'
deeming a blanket English-only rule like the one in Garcia,a "burdensome term and condition of employment," presumably violative of
2
Title VII. 1
In 1988, in Gutierrez v. Municipal Court,22 the Ninth Circuit
upheld a preliminary injunction enjoining the enforcement of an English-only rule 23 created by the employers-judges of the Municipal
Court. 24 The English-only rule at issue completely barred private
speech among the bilingual clerks in Spanish during on-duty periOpportunity Act on this issue. Vasquez v. McAllen Bag & Supply Co., 660 F.2d 686, 688 (5th
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1122 (1982).
18. 618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 625 F.2d 1016 (5th Cir. 1980), cert denied, 449
U.S. 1113 (1981).
19. Ia at 266. The court upheld the English-only rule, finding "valid business reasons"
for its imposition. Id. Further, it found Garcia's conduct to be a deliberate violation of the
rule, concluding that the language that a bilingual person elects to speak at a particular time is
a matter of the individual's choice. Id.
20. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7 (1988).
21. Cases decided subsequent to the issuance of these Guidelines generally complied with
the framework they established. See EEOC Dec. 83-7, 31 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1861,
1862 (Apr. 20, 1983) (English-only rule in an oil refinery business was appropriately tailored
since it applied only to employees who worked in laboratory and processing areas where a
potential existed for fires and explosions, and only applied during the performance of job duties
and not under circumstances such as breaks, lunch periods, or casual conversations unrelated
to job duties.); see also Jurado v. Eleven-Fifty Corp., 813 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 1987). In Jurado,
a radio station ordered a single disc jockey to cease his occasional on-the-air use of Spanish
because the station had determined that his interspersing of comments in a foreign language
during his broadcasts confused the audience and was potentially damaging to the station's
ratings. Id. at 1410. The station's English-only rule complied with the intent of the
Guidelines because the rule applied exclusively to on-the-air broadcasting, that is, the product
the employer was offering the public. The station did not require the disc jockey or the other
station employees, to conduct their off-the-air conversations in English. Id.
22. 838 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1988).
23. The rule read as follows:
The English language shall be spoken by all Court employees during regular
working hours while attending to assigned work duties, unless an employee is
translating for the non-English speaking public. This rule does not apply to
employees while on their lunch hour or work breaks.
Appellee's Response to Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc and Petition for Rehearing at 1,
Gutierrez v. Municipal Court, 838 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1988) (Nos. 85-5931, 85-6532, and 865888).
24. The English-only rule was directed against the clerks of the court, including the
plaintiff, Alva Gutierrez, a Hispanic woman. Gutierrez, 838 F.2d at 1054.
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ods. 2 It did not apply to the performance of their "judicial" dutieswhich primarily entailed translating for Spanish-speaking people
utilizing the court.26 In part, the judges claimed that validity for the
English-only rule derived from the recently passed state constitutional
provision declaring English the official language of California. 27
Although the judges appealed this decision to the United States
Supreme Court, it was eventually dismissed as moot.28
Thus, whether a bilingual employee has a right to speak a language other than English at the workplace, and whether that right
outweighs the employer's prerogative to run his business as he sees fit
is unresolved. In Garcia v. Gloor' 9 the Fifth Circuit held that a bilingual employee has no such right.30 Conversely, the EEOC Guidelines
have declared English-only rules discriminatory. 31 Finally, in Gutierrez v. Municipal Court, 32 the Ninth Circuit held such rules as discriminatory towards bilingual employees. The Supreme Court, however,
dismissed the case as moot due to the plaintiff's lack of standing. 33
Because the contradicting lines of authority have not been reconciled,
the right to express oneself in the language of one's choice appears to
be dangerously elusive.
This Comment addresses the issue of whether a requirement that
employees speak only English in their workplace constitutes discrimination prohibited under Title VII. Given the split between the courts
of appeals and the ambiguity over the role that the EEOC Guidelines
play in this conflict, this Comment will explore the implications of
those issues left unanswered. Section II will lay the foundation for the
analysis by examining Title VII and National Origin Discrimination
in relation to English-only rules in the workplace. Section II will also
review the role the EEOC has played in establishing the contours of a
right to language in the workplace. Section III will discuss the Ninth
Circuit's analysis of English-only rules in Gutierrez. Included in this
analysis will be a discussion of the effect that the official English
25. Actually, the employer required that Spanish be used in the performance of much of
the clerks' official duties. Id. at 1044.

26. Id. at 1041 n.14.
27. Id. at 1043-44. While the Ninth Circuit summarily rejected this reasoning, it was

nonetheless noteworthy because this was the first time an official language amendment had
been utilized as an argument by litigants. See Cox, supra note 3, at 17, col. 1; see also
Carrizosa, supra note 3, at 1, col. 2.
28. Gutierrez v. Municipal Court, 109 S. Ct. 1736 (1989).
29. 618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 625 F.2d 1016 (5th Cir. 1980).
30. Id. at 268-69.
31. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.7 (1988).
32. 838 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1988).
33. Gutierrez v. Municipal Court, 109 S. Ct. 1736 (1989).
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movement has had in this area and the role it played in Gutierrez-the
first case in which the official status of the English language was
presented in defense of an English-only rule in the workplace. Section
IV will compare the holdings of Gutierrez and Garcia in order to illustrate the contradiction between the courts of appeals and highlight the
focus of the current debate. Finally, Section V concludes that where
the courts recognize limited English-only rules in the workplace, they
should do so only by first placing the burden upon the proponent of
the enforced monolingualism to demonstrate that the potential harm
to person or property outweighs the individual right to expression.
II.

NATIONAL ORIGIN DISCRIMINATION: A BACKGROUND

Discrimination in employment based upon a person's national

origin is unlawful in the United States.34 An overview of those primary federal statutes and constitutional amendments considered
applicable to national origin discrimination indicates that the term
"national origin" was not widely used until the years just preceding
the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 3' The most useful definition of national origin discrimination is that provided by the EEOC.3 6
It is broad enough to encompass any instance in which any individual-including an American of white Anglo-Saxon ancestry-is discriminated against not only because of ancestry, but also because of
"physical, cultural, or linguistic characteristics of a national origin
group."

' 37

Problems of employment discrimination arising from a classification based on national origin deserve special attention for a number of
34. Interestingly enough, the problem of discrimination based solely on national origin
seems to generate little attention in the field of employment discrimination law. Indeed, a
national origin approach is often not used by employment discrimination plaintiffs and, when
used, it is infrequently successful. See Keotahian, National Origin Discrimination in
Employment: Do Plaintiffs Ever Win?, 11 EMPLOYEE RELATIONS L.J. 467 (1985).
35. The thirteenth amendment deals solely with slavery and therefore applies only to the
issue of race discrimination. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. The fourteenth amendment
provides broader coverage, extending equality rights to persons naturalized in the United
States. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. It provides no further specific protection, however,
against national origin discrimination. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
36. The EEOC definition reads:
The Commission defines national origin discrimination broadly as including,
but not limited to, the denial of equal employment opportunity because of an
individual's, or his or her ancestor's, place of origin; or because an individual has
the physical, cultural or linguistic characteristicsof a national origin group.
29 C.F.R. § 1606.1 (1988) (emphasis added).
37. Id. The EEOC's broad definition of national origin discrimination provides a unifying
thread among the national origin employment discrimination cases and helps to delineate the
boundaries of this category. It must be emphasized, however, that the definition remains one
of a federal regulatory agency and is not binding on the courts.

1216

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol.44:1209

reasons. First, there is an increasing number of persons immigrating
to the United States, adding considerably to the class of persons of
non-U.S. national origin who may become subject to discriminatory
employment practices.3" Second, there is a tendency for national origin to be the basis of employment discrimination in reaction to international affairs. 39 Racism, disguised as strong anti-immigration
sentiment, has been revealed as the motivating force behind advocates
of the movement for making English the country's official language.' °
Much of the employment discrimination based on language is similarly motivated. 4 ' The potential for such discrimination will exist so
long as the United States contains citizens of diverse and distinguishable national origins. 42
38. From 1970 to 1980, over six million people immigrated to the United States (this figure
includes the estimated number of illegal aliens). Morganthau, Closing the Door?, NEWSWEEK,
June 25, 1984, at 22.
39. World events, such as World Wars I and II, the Iranian hostage crisis, and the Middle
East Wars, have caused Americans of German, Japanese, Arab, and Jewish origin to become
subject to employment discrimination merely because of their national origin. See, e.g.,
McCoombs, Fired Gray & Co. Officer Claims Bias, Wash. Post, Apr. 13, 1984, at 1 A, col. 1
(An American of Armenian ancestry was discharged by a Washington, D.C. public relations
firm at the request of its major client, the Embassy of Turkey.).
40. The racist views of Dr. John Tanton, one of U.S. English's co-founders, are often cited
as evidence of the movement's true goals. Cox, 'English-Only': A Legal Polyglot, Nat'l L.J.,
Oct. 26, 1987, at 1, col. 2, 10, col. 1. Dr. Tanton, an environmentalist who was president of
Zero Population Growth (ZPG) in the late 1970's, reportedly emphasized "excessive"
immigration as a source of overcrowding problems. Id. His radical stance made ZPG
directors uncomfortable, prompting him to form a splinter group, Federation for American
Immigration Reform (FAIR), that lobbied for tougher immigration laws and lower
immigration quotas. Id. Today, FAIR staff members migrate between FAIR and U.S.
English. Id.
In Autumn 1988, Dr. Tanton resigned as Chairman of U.S. English when a memorandum
he wrote was made public. Echoes of Nativism, AMERICA, Dec. 10, 1988, at 483. In the high
birthrate among Hispanics, Dr. Tanton saw a threat to the political dominance of nonHispanic whites; and in the Catholicism of the growing numbers of Spanish-speaking peoples,
he saw a similar threat to the principle of church-state separation. "As whites see their power
and control over their lives declining, will they simply go quietly into the night?" Jimenez,
Official Use of English? No, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1, 1988 at 35; see also Fong, Hidden Agenda?
Cracks in 'English Only' Campaign Widen as Efforts Expand, Los Angeles Daily J., Sept. 28,
1987, at 1, col. 3 (explores criticisms that the official English movement's aim is to play upon
the public's fears about immigration, particularly from the major source countries of Asia and
Latin America).
41. See, e.g., Saucedo v. Brothers Well Serv., Inc., 464 F. Supp. 919, 921 (S.D. Tex. 1979)
(plaintiff warned not to speak Spanish because his superior did not tolerate any "Mesican"
talk).
42. Indeed, the tie between strong anti-immigration sentiments and discriminatory
practices based on language is illustrated throughout the history of the United States'
treatment of its immigrants:
The imposition of direct immigration restriction in the 1920's removed most of
the reasons for worrying about the threat posed by aliens to the American way of
life, and so removed the incentive for using English as a weapon against such a
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A.

Title VII and English-Only Rules
Title V11
as a comprehensive prohibition of employment discrimination based upon race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin," including both overt and covert discriminatory practices.45
4

3 functions

Moreover, employment discrimination is not limited only to discrimination in hiring, firing, or the payment of wages, but also extends to

discriminatory terms and conditions of employment." Title VII
applies to state and local governments,4" employment agencies,4" and
all employers and labor organizations in industries affecting commerce that have fifteen or more employees or members, respectively.4 9
threat. The fact that language can be used as an offensive and ugly weapon
against foreign-language speakers, whether through political, economic, or
educational requirements, is, however, an unavoidable lesson of the
Americanization movement.
Leibowicz, supra note 5, at 538.
43. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988).
44. An employee bringing an action under Title VII has the initial burden of proof
regardless of which form of discrimination is alleged. He must demonstrate: (1) that he
belongs to a Title VII protected class; (2) that he applied and was qualified for an open
position; (3) that he was rejected; and (4) that after the rejection, the employer continued to
seek applicants. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). The employee
may establish his prima facie case either through proof of overt discriminatory acts or
practices (the "disparate treatment" theory), or through proof of discriminatory effect (the
"disparate impact" theory).
45. While Congress initially intended Title VII as a prohibition only against overt
discriminatory practices (disparate treatment) based on race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin, this view gradually expanded to include more subtle forms of discrimination. See S.
REP. No. 1137, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1970). The Senate Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare commented:
In 1964, employment discrimination tended to be viewed as a series of isolated
and distinguishable events, for the most part due to ill-will on the part of some
identifiable individual or organization . . . . Employment discrimination, as
viewed today, is a far more complex and pervasive phenomenon. Experts
familiar with the subject generally describe the system in terms of "systems" and
"effects" rather than simply intentional wrongs, and the literature on the subject
is replete with discussions of, for example, the mechanics of seniority in lines of
progression, perpetuation of the present effects of pre-Act discriminatory
practices through various institutional devices, and testing and validation
requirements.
Id.; see also Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (Title VII prohibits not only
overt discrimination, but also employment practices that are neutral in form yet discriminatory in application.).
46. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988). Not only does employment discrimination have many
manifestations, but so do the available remedial provisions. The purpose of Title VII's
remedial provisions is to make discrimination victims whole. The remedies include
reinstatement, hiring, promotion, back pay (up to two years before a charge is filed), and
orders barring future Title VII violations. A prevailing party may also recover its attorneys'
fees and court costs.
47. Id. §§ 2000e(b), 2000e-2(a).
48. Id. §§ 2000e(c), 2000e-2(b).
49. Id. §§ 2000e(e), 2000e-2(c).
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Differentiation based on religion, sex, or national origin may be permitted only where a "bona fide occupational qualification" (BFOQ)

for the job exists. 50

Title VII prohibits intentional discrimination with respect to
conditions of employment-that is, disparate treatment. 5 1 It also forbids facially neutral workplace rules where they have a disparate

impact on protected groups of workers.5 2 English-only rules tend to
50. Section 2000e-2(e)(l) provides:
[I]t shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and
employ employees... on the basis of... religion, sex, or national origin in those
certain instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide
occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that
particular business enterprise.
Id. § 2000e-2(e)(l). This exception permits an employer to institute rules reasonably necessary
for the normal operation of that particular business. The burden of proof rests on the
employer to demonstrate that special characteristics attributable to a select group prevent the
safe and efficient performance of that particular job. Board of Trustees of Keene State College
v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24 (1978). Because overt discriminatory practices demand a strict standard of justification, the EEOC has issued guidelines which narrowly construe the BFOQ
exception. See 29 C.F.R. § 1606.4 (1988) (stating that "It]he exception stated in Section 703(e)
of Title VII, that national origin may be a bona fide occupational qualification, shall be strictly
construed"). The courts have also expressed the desire to sharply limit the scope of this exception. See, e.g., Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 389 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971) (stating EEOC guidelines for narrow construction in sex discrimination).
The employer must show that a policy or requirement is a BFOQ when charged with
intentional discrimination (disparate treatment). See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400
U.S. 542 (1971). The lower standard of business necessity is appropriate when the employer is
charged with covert discriminatory practices (disparate effect). See Dothard v. Rawlington,
433 U.S. 321 (1977). Thus, where a BFOQ exception is involved, the employer's burden is to
demonstrate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the practice in question.
51. Disparate treatment is intentional discrimination. Under disparate treatment analysis,
the employer is accused of treating some people less favorably than others because of their
class characteristics. See Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252
(1981). Although the main focus is whether the employer had a discriminatory motive in his
employment decision, technically the employee is not required to prove intent. International
Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-336 n.15 (1977).
Comparative evidence, based on the treatment of "similarly situated" persons, is sufficient
to establish the plaintiff's prima facie case. This entails comparing the employee who alleges
discrimination with another employee in the same or a similar position to see if the treatment
is, in fact, different. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 248.
52. Disparate impact is neutral on its face, but discriminatory in its impact or effect upon
employees in protected categories. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 446 (1982). It can occur
at any point of the personnel function which has a disparate effect on a protected group,
including hiring, pre-employment inquiries, transfer, promotion, fringe benefits, and
termination. In disparate impact analysis, proof of the employer's discriminatory motive or
intent is not required. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15; Moore v. Hughes
Helicopters, Inc., 708 F.2d 475, 481 (9th Cir. 1983). The origin of disparate impact analysis is
generally attributed to Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), arguably the most
important Supreme Court decision in employment discrimination law. Griggs established that
Title VII prohibits not only overt discrimination, but also practices that are neutral in form yet
discriminatory in operation. Id. at 431. The Court concluded that Title VII precludes the use
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fall into this second type of discrimination. For example, a facially
neutral rule that falls more harshly on a protected group-such as the
English-only rules do on Hispanics-violates Title VII unless it is jus-

tified by business necessity. 3 The English-only rule is thus biased in
its effect against the individual based on his national origin. In one
EEOC case, an employer violated Title VII by promulgating a rule
restricting Spanish-surnamed American employees from speaking
Spanish on the employer's premises. 4 The English-only rule was in
force during both working and nonworking hours. This restriction

was imposed because the supervisors understood no Spanish; it was
not considered a business necessity and no other genuine business

need was demonstrated." The Commission concluded that it would
be difficult, if not impossible, to conceive of a situation where business
necessity would permit a ban on the use of certain languages during
5 6 and that such restrictions
nonworking hours,
would be
7
discriminatory.-

Employer rules requiring employees to speak only in English are
distinct from English fluency requirements, in that an individual may
of testing or measuring procedures unless they are reasonably related to safe and efficient job
performance. Id. at 436. Consequently, the EEOC has held that fluency in English as a
condition of employment is a "test" within the meaning of Gnggs. EEOC Dec. AL 68-1-155E,
I Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 921 (1969) (reasonable cause to believe that an employer
violated Title VII by refusing to consider Spanish-surnamed Americans for employment as
retail store manager on the basis of accent); EEOC Dec. YAU 9-048, 2 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 78 (1969) (reasonable cause to believe that an employer violated Title VII when he
discharged a Spanish-surnamed American allegedly for poor work due to his inability to
communicate well in English).
53. If an employee can establish a prima facie case of disparate impact, the employer may
rebut the presumption by an adequate showing of business necessity. Albermale Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975). There are two prongs to the business necessity defense. First,
the practice must be job-related. Id.; Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 331 n.14 (1977). In
other words, the policy instituted must be rationally designed to select potentially successful
employees; good faith alone is insufficient to establish such proof. Id.; Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
Second, the practice must be necessary to the safe and efficient operation of that business. Id.
If another, less discriminatory practice can be used effectively, then the employer's existing
practice is obviously not essential and, therefore, not justified. Albermarle, 422 U.S. at 425.
54. EEOC Dec. No. 81-25, 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1820 (July 6, 1981).
55. Id.
56. Id.; see also EEOC Dec. 71-446, 2 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1127 (Nov. 5, 1970),
where the EEOC stated that "[i]t is now well settled that conversation, including social
conversation, at work both during working and non-working time, is a term or condition of
employment" within the boundaries of Title VII. Id. The Commission held that it is a term,
condition, or privilege of employment for Spanish-surnamed Americans to speak Spanish at
work. Id. The EEOC qualified its position, however, by stating that there may be occasions
when business necessity would permit an employer to prohibit employees from speaking
languages not understood by supervisors at their work stations during working hours. Id., 2
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1128.
57. EEOC Dec. No. 81-25, 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1820 (July 6, 1981); see also
29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(a) (1988).
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violate an English-only rule regardless of his fluency. Naturally, a
person of marginal English fluency will be among the first to have
difficulty in complying with an English-only rule. Both English-only
rules and language fluency requirements have a disparate impact on
groups of people based on national origin, and they also may be the
basis of disparate treatments. 58 Moreover, both can be rebutted by
business necessity defenses and BFOQ exception arguments, respectively. 59 Language fluency requirements, however, are different
national origin discrimination problems, and are beyond the scope of
6
this Comment.w
B.

The Role of the EEOC in Defining the Boundaries
of English-Only Rules

Prior to the issuance of the 1980 Guidelines, the EEOC had identified national origin discrimination in employer rules that either
required the use of English exclusively in the workplace 61 or that forbade speaking another language, 62 unless the rule was justified by efficiency or safety considerations. 63 Two decades ago, the EEOC first
considered specific situations where a policy prohibiting speaking
Spanish in normal interoffice contacts discriminated on the basis of
national origin. 6"
58. Frontera v. Sindell, 522 F.2d 1215 (6th Cir. 1975), indirectly involved a language
requirement. In Frontera, a plaintiff of Spanish ancestry claimed he failed a carpenter's
examination for a city position because the exam was administered in English and not in
Spanish. Id. at 1216. The plaintiff had experienced no difficulty communicating on the job
when working at the airport in a temporary position before taking the test. Id. Yet, although
it was proven that the test had a disparate impact on Spanish-speaking applicants, the court
found that under a fourteenth amendment standard, Frontera's civil rights had not been
violated. Id. at 1220. The court applied a balancing test, with the costs involved prevailing
over the detrimental impact on the minority group. Id. at 1219; see also Chung v. Morehouse
College, 11 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1084 (N.D. Ga. 1975) (Chung's English, as well as
his teaching skills, were held insufficient to justify his retention on the Morehouse faculty.).
59. See supra notes 50 & 53.
60. See generally Greenwood, Employer English-Only and English Proficiency Policies May
be Discriminatory, 62 FLA. B.J. 70, 71 (1988); Leibowitz, English Literacy: Legal Sanction for
Discrimination, 45 NOTRE DAME LAW. 7 (1969).
61. EEOC Dec. 71-446, 2 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1127 (Nov. 5, 1970).
62. EEOC Dec. 72-0281 $ 6293 (Aug. 9, 1971).
63. Safety concerns play a large role in determining the validity of an English-only rule in
the workplace. See, e.g., EEOC Dec. 83-7 6836 (Apr. 20, 1983) (A refinery's English-only
rule in its laboratory and processing areas where a potential existed for fires and explosions,
and to all areas only during emergencies, was upheld for safety considerations.).
64. In EEOC Dec. 71-446, 2 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1127 (Nov. 5, 1970), the
English-only rule prohibited Spanish language communications among employees on the
premises, both during lunch and other non-working times. The EEOC found the rule to be
violative of Title VII because the basis for the rule was the supervisors' inability to understand
the conversations. Id. Naturally, no business need was revealed for the restriction on personal
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In 1980, the EEOC Guidelines on National Origin Discrimination6 were updated to address two primary issues: (1) English-only
rules and (2) the degree of English facility that an employer could
require of employees." Both issues arose out of a concern to protect
the rights of Hispanics (as well as other ethnic groups) from discrimination based on their desire to speak their native language in nonwork
situations, and to protect individuals from discrimination based on
accent or insufficient fluency in the English language. In issuing the
68
Guidelines, the EEOC emphasized the concept of "job-relatedness.
Thus, if an employer seeks to prohibit a foreign language from being
spoken on the premises, he must show that such a prohibition is actually necessary for safe and efficient job performance.69
In addressing the permissibility of English-only rules, the EEOC
distinguished between a blanket English-only rule, requiring English
to be spoken at all times, and a limited rule, requiring English to be
spoken only at certain times or under certain conditions.' ° The
EEOC deemed a blanket rule to be a "burdensome term and condition of employment" presumed to violate Title VII, necessitating close
scrutiny. 71 Thus, the 1980 Guidelines began by creating a strong presumption against a flat rule requiring the speaking of English at all
times.72 On the other hand, a limited rule was permissible if the
employer could show a business necessity for it73-a contention that
would be strengthened if safety considerations were involved.74 In
addition, the Guidelines required adequate notice of the English-only
conversations, especially where the ban on the use of such language applied to the nonworking
time of the employees. Id., 2 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1128.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

29 C.F.R. § 1606.7 (1988).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id § 1606.7(b); see also EEOC Dec. 81-25, 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1820

(1981).
70. Compare 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(a) (1988) (English-only rules applied at all times) with id
§ 1606.7(b) (English-only rules applied only at certain times).
71. Id § 1606.7(a). Even before the Guidelines, the EEOC had rejected English-only rules

that applied at all times. In EEOC Dec. 71-446, 2 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1127 (Nov. 5,
1970), the EEOC stated that reasonable cause existed to believe that a rule directing Spanishsurnamed employees not to speak Spanish at their work stations, during lunch or at other

nonworking times, violated Title VII. Even if the rule were viewed as a prohibition addressed
to all employees against speaking a language not understood by supervisors, it was clear, said
the EEOC, that the rule denied the Spanish-surnamed employees a term, condition, or
privilege afforded to others-namely, conversation in the language with which they were most
comfortable. Id., 2 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1128. In addition, no business necessity
had been alleged or shown for the rule. Id.
72. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1606.7(a), 1606.7(b) (1988).

73. Id § 1606.7(b).
74. See EEOC Dec. 83-7

6836 (Apr. 20, 1983) (A refinery's English-only rule in its
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rule,7" a move which, may have been inspired by Saucedo v. Brothers
Well Service, Inc. ,76 a Texas district court case questioning the existence and notice of an alleged English-only rule." Full and fair notice
of a limited English-only rule and the consequences of violating the
rule must be given to employees; in the absence of such notice, the
EEOC will consider any adverse employment decision based on violation of the rule to be evidence of discrimination on the basis of
national origin.78
The EEOC has also required that English-only rules be narrowly
tailored to accomplish the legitimate concern of business efficiency or
safety. Thus, an overly broad rule reaching even to employees' private conversations is more likely to be discriminatory in intent and/or
effect. 79 An example of an appropriately tailored rule is found in
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Decision 83-7.8° There,
safety considerations justified the English-only rule at an oil refinery
because it applied only to those refinery employees working in laboratory and processing areas where a potential existed for fires and explosions, and to all employees only during emergencies.81 Further, the
rule was effective exclusively during performance of job duties and not
during breaks, lunch periods, or casual conversations unrelated to job
laboratory and processing areas where a potential existed for fires and explosions, and to all
employees only during emergencies, was upheld for safety considerations.).
75. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(c) (1988).
76. 464 F. Supp. 919 (S.D. Tex. 1979).
77. The supervisor had told Saucedo that his foreman did not allow any "Mesican" talk,
but Saucedo was never told that there was a company rule forbidding speaking Spanish, much
less that anyone would be immediately fired for speaking as much as one Spanish word. Id. at
921.
78. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(c) (1988).
79. Id. § 1606.7(a). For example, in EEOC Dec. 81-25, 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
1820 (1981), the EEOC invalidated an English-only rule because of its overbreadth. In this
decision, the EEOC concluded that a rule requiring employees of a tailor shop to speak only
English during work hours constituted unlawful discrimination in violation of Title VII. Id.,
27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1823. The employer argued that the rule was not absolute
inasmuch as it applied only to certain work areas and was only a temporary measure. Id., 27
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1821. The EEOC, however, found that the rule was an
absolute prohibition against the use of any language but English on the job, presumptively a
violation of Title VII, unless based on a business necessity. Id., 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) at 1822. Noting that the employer had failed to prove a business necessity, the EEOC
invalidated the rule. Id., 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1823. It stated that employer
could have used means other than an absolute English-only rule to solve its problems. Id., 27
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1822.
80. EEOC Dec. 83-7, 31 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1861 (1983). The notice the
employer posted for the English-only rule made clear that, other than specifically provided,
there were no language restrictions. Moreover, the notice described the penalty for failing to
comply with the rule. Id.
81. Id.
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duties."2 Given these conditions, the EEOC concluded that the rule
was sufficiently narrow to accomplish the specified purpose of assuring effective communication in specified times and places where the
83
threat of fire, explosion, or other casualty existed.
There are also situations where, in theory, an English-only rule
may be justified for business necessity reasons but whose application
in specific circumstances may be nonetheless intolerably discriminatory. In Saucedo v. Brothers Well Service, Inc.," for example, a Mexican-American employee of an oil drilling operation was fired for
speaking two words of Spanish on the job when not engaged in hazardous work. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas stated that, generally, an English-only rule applying to
personnel engaged in oil drilling operations would be justifiable as a
business necessity in view of the hazardous nature of the work and the
need for close cooperation between the workers."5 In light of the facts
surrounding the employee's dismissal, however, the court found that
the rule's application had been unjust and discriminatory. The court
concluded that the superintendent's immediate firing of the employee
was an act impermissibly based on racial animus rather than one
6
based upon the violation of a narrowly drawn English-only rule.
The EEOC Guidelines on National Origin and numerous EEOC
decisions regarding English-only rules reflect the same fundamental
principles: English-only rules applied at all times are presumably violative of Title VII, whereas limited rules are justifiable only by a
showing of genuine business necessity. From these two sources, the
appropriate boundaries of English-only rules and their validity in certain circumstances can be adduced. This is especially helpful in establishing an adequate framework in which to examine the contradictory
decisions of Gutierrez 7 and Garcia."8

III. GUTIERREZ V. MUNICIPAL COURT. ENGLISH-ONLY? No.
A.

The FactualSetting

Gutierrez v. Municipal Court involved a Los Angeles municipal
court personnel rule prohibiting bilingual clerks from speaking Spanish on the job. 9 The Southeast Judicial District of the Los Angeles
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id.
Id.
464 F. Supp. 919 (S.D. Tex. 1979).
Id.
Id. at 920.
Gutierrez v. Municipal Court, 838 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1988).
Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1113 (1981).
Gutierrez, 838 F.2d at 1031.
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Municipal Court employed a number of bilingual Hispanic-Americans who served as deputy court clerks. As part of their judicial
duties, these clerks translated for the non-English-speaking public
constituting a substantial portion of the population served by the
court. In March 1984, the municipal court instituted a personnel rule
forbidding employees from speaking any language other than English,
except when acting as translators.' One of the clerks, Alva Gutierrez, filed a complaint with the EEOC, and filed suit in the California
district court in March 1985. The district court enjoined enforcement
of the rule, 9' and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit affirmed the injunction. 92 The Ninth Circuit held that an
"English-only" rule may be permitted by Title VII only if justified by
a "business necessity," which the employers-the municipal court
and Judges DeDubovay, Bunnett, and Schooling-were unable to
93

show.

The defendants' appeal for a rehearing en banc was denied with
an opinion. 94 A lengthy dissent from that rejection, submitted by
Judge Kozinski, stated that the case "cries out for en banc consideration." 95 Judge Kozinski viewed the panel's opinion as conflicting with
the Fifth Circuit's opinion in Garcia, and being directly contrary to
the Ninth Circuit's prior opinion in Jurado v. Eleven-Fifty Corporation.96 He criticized the majority for not attempting to distinguish
Garcia, and for not acknowledging the reasoning that was used
therein. He perceived the Gutierrez decision as creating a "sharp and
o

90. Id. at 1036. In December 1984, the rule was amended to exclude conversations during
breaks or lunchtime. All other conversations conducted at work, however, including private
intra-employee conversations, remained subject to the rule. Id. The rule ultimately read:
The English language shall be spoken by all Court employees during regular
working hours while attending to assigned work duties, unless an employee is
translating for the non-English speaking public. This rule does not apply to
employees while on their lunch hour or work breaks.
Appellee's Response to Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc and Petition for Rehearing at 1,
Gutierrez v. Municipal Court, 838 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1988) (Nos. 85-5931, 85-6532, and 865888).
91. Gutierrez v. County of Los Angeles, 41 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1464 (May 14,
1985).
92. Gutierrez, 838 F.2d at 1031.
93. Id. at 1040.
We agree [with the EEOC] that English-only rules generally have an adverse
impact on protected groups and that they should be closely scrutinized.... Such
rules can "create an atmosphere of inferiority, isolation, and intimidation."...
Accordingly, we adopt the EEOC's business necessity test as the proper standard
for determining the validity of limited English-only rules.
Id. (citation omitted).
94. 861 F.2d 1187, 1188 (9th Cir. 1988) (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
95. Id.
96. Id. (citing Jurado v. Eleven-Fifty Corp., 813 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 1987)).
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irreconcilable conflict between the two circuits...- [and noted that]
this [English-only rule]
is precisely the type of rule that demands
97
uniformity.
national
.After the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, the
judgment was vacated and remanded to the Ninth Circuit with
instructions to dismiss the appeal as moot.98 The EEOC had granted
the plaintiff, Alva Gutierrez, total disability subsequent to the filing of
the case. Thus, she was no longer an employee at the municipal court
and lacked standing to continue the suit.99 Therefore, whether an
employer may lawfully prohibit employees from privately conversing
with coworkers in the language in which they feel most comfortable is
an employment discrimination question still unresolved by the
Supreme Court. However, the Ninth Circuit's thorough review of the
issues in Guiterrez merits discussion for the insightful analysis it
offers. 1o
B.

The Ninth Circuit's Review

In affirming the grant of a preliminary injunction against
enforcement of the English-only rule, the Ninth Circuit held that Ms.
Gutierrez had shown both the possibility of irreparable injury and a
likelihood of success on the merits of her claim that the rule constituted discrimination on the basis of national origin in violation of
Title VII. 10 1 Noting that English-only rules often have a disparate
impact on members of groups protected against discrimination by
Title VII, 10 2 the court agreed with the EEOC Guidelines that deemed
limited English-only rules of the type at issue valid only if justified by
business necessity. 10 3 Although the defense urged that there was a
substantial state interest in establishing the use of English, the court
found that prohibiting employees from speaking Spanish among
themselves was not related to that goal, especially where bilingual
employees were required to speak Spanish to the non-English-speaking public. 10 In upholding the preliminary injunction, the court con97. Id. at 1189.
98. Gutierrez v. Municipal Court, 109 S. Ct. 1736 (1989).
99. See supra note 2.
100. See Gutierrez v. Municipal Court, 838 F.2d 1031, 1037-46 (9th Cir. 1988).
101. Id at 1038.
102. Id. at 1040. In upholding the preliminary injunction, the Ninth Circuit applied the
adverse impact theory under Title VII. Id. at 1038-41. The court, therefore, did not reach the
issue of whether the preliminary injunction could have been upheld under a disparate
treatment Title VII theory, or under a claim based on deprivation of federal constitutional
rights.
103. Id. at 1039.
104. Id. at 1042.
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sidered evidence offered by Ms. Gutierrez in the district court
suggesting that the English-only rule had discriminatory effect upon
her, upon her Hispanic coworkers, and upon the work environment. 10 5 The evidence indicated that the working atmosphere of the
office had deteriorated substantially as a direct result of the rule: Hispanics felt belittled by the regulation; 1°6 non-Spanish-speaking
employees and supervisors had made racially discriminatory remarks
directed at Hispanics; 1 7 and racial animosity between Hispanics and
non-Hispanics had increased since the rule's imposition. 10 8 Moreover, no evidence supported the employers' contention that the Spanish language was being used to disguise discriminatory or
insubordinate remarks. 109 Nor did the evidence indicate that the
speaking of Spanish between employees was disruptive, especially in
view of the clerks' judicial duties that mandated speaking Spanish to
the majority of the public not fluent in English. 11 The court stated
that additional Spanish was unlikely to create more disruption than
already existed."' Further, the court found it illogical to require
English in conversations between employees in order to enable nonSpanish-speaking supervisors to discern whether employees were correctly disseminating information because Spanish was regularly spoken to members of the public in the course of the clerks' judicial
duties and the supervisors were incapable of following those
105. Id.
106. Id. The testimony of Hispanic courthouse employees reveals that the English-only
rules had caused them emotional pain: "I felt it [English-only rule] was wrong. I really feltThis sounds real dramatic, but this is really-I felt they were denying my right to be me."
Brief for Appellee at 5, Gutierrez v. Municipal Court, 838 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1988) (Nos. 855931, 85-6532, and 86-5888) (citing Deposition of Evelyn Ramirez, p. 24, line 25).
107. Evidence shows that the rule had the foreseeable consequence of encouraging
discriminatory conduct on the part of non-Hispanic workers and supervisors. As Ms.
Gutierrez testified:
When the rule came out, I felt humiliated, belittled .

. .

. They [Anglo co-

workers] made us feel that way. I had a supervisor when I was working at Civil
and Small Claims in the beginning when I started there, [and the supervisor said)
"I don't a speak a Spanish." . . . She would make, like, you know, she would
make fun of Mexicans when they would ask her you speak Spanish. They use to
say, "Do you speak a Spanish? [and the supervisor would answer] No a, I don't
speak a Spanish.". . . She would make fun of them when they would try to speak
English. She would sit there and say, "did you hear that?" I would be sitting
there listening and I didn't like it.
Brief for Appellee at 8-9, Gutierrez v. Municipal Court, 838 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1988) (Nos.
85-5931, 85-6532, and 86-5888) (citing Excerpts of Record at 9-14).
108. Id., see Gutierrez, 838 F.2d at 1042-43.
109. Gutierrez, 838 F.2d at 1042-43.
110. Id. at 1042.
111. Id.
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discussions. 112
Finally, the court rejected the argument that the English-only
rule was required by the recently added provisions in the state constitution establishing English as the state's official language. 13 The
court stated that the cited provisions did not require the speaking of
114
English under the circumstances covered by the challenged rule.
Further, the court noted that enactment of a state statute or constitutional provision does not create a business necessity unless the statute
or provision itself meets the business necessity test. I15
C. The Official Language Movement and Language
Minority Rights
The latest wave of immigrants entering the United States is over-16
whelmingly comprised of people from Spanish-speaking countries."
These immigrants generally come from countries in close geographical proximity to the United States." 7 This close proximity, coupled
with modem transportation and advancements in communication
technology, provides them with a greater opportunity to retain cultural and linguistic ties to their native country as compared with most
other immigrant groups, past and present."' For these reasons, it is
these people who make up the most visible portion of this country's
language minorities." 9 In the few Supreme Court cases concerning
language rights, the Court has invalidated laws attempting to limit the
rights of language minorities. 2 Nonetheless, some Americans per112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id. at 1043.
Id. at 1043-44.
Id.
Id. at 1044.
See generally Morgenthau, supra note 38, at 22.
Id.
The 1980 Census revealed that 89.1% of Americans speak only English at home.
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEr. OF COMMERCE, 1980 CENSUS OF POPULATION AND
HOUSING, doc. PHC80-SI-1, at 14 (Mar. 1982).

119. The term "language minority" as defined by Congress, refers to those persons who are
Asian American, American Indian, Alaskan Natives, or of Spanish Heritage. Voting Rights
Act of 1965-Extension, Pub. L. No. 94-73, 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 790.
120. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966) (Section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act
of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(e) (1972 & Supp. 1986) providing that no person was to be denied
the right to vote, regardless of his or her inability to read or write English, if he or she had
completed the sixth grade in an accredited Puerto Rican school in which the language of
instruction was not English was upheld because it appropriately enforced the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment.); Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974) (Placing nonEnglish-speaking Chinese students in English-only classrooms was a violation of Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.).
In defending language rights in Morgan and Lau, the Supreme Court extended statutory,
rather than constitutional, protections to language minorities. Two other Supreme Court
cases, however, have held that governmental restrictions on language use are constitutionally
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ceive the existence of these language minorities as a unique threat to
American unity,1 21 and a new movement has emerged to nullify this
perceived threat.1 22 This movement has focused primarily on efforts
to declare English the official language of the country through an
English Language Amendment ("ELA"). 23 ELA proponents claim
that the amendment's purpose is to protect the status of English as the
primary language of the United States and to circumvent what they
perceive as a growing language separatism threatening national
unity. 24 Conversely, opponents of the amendment believe that the
ELA is a veiled attempt, fueled by racism, to deny language minorities their civil rights. 125 An examination of this movement is useful in
this discussion of employment discrimination based upon national oripermissible. In Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 271 U.S. 500 (1926), a Philippine statute that
prohibited the keeping of account books in any language other than English, Spanish, or a
local Philippine dialect effectively prevented the petitioner and those similarly situated from
conducting business. The Court held that the statute denied Chinese-speaking persons equal
protection and due process under the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 524-25. In Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), a Nebraska statute prohibiting the teaching of any subject in
any language other than English before a student had completed the eighth grade was held an
impermissible violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 400.
These cases indicate that the fourteenth amendment limits legislative action proscribing
the use of foreign languages. Moreover, the Meyer Court indicated that the use of a particular
language should not be unlawfully forced. The Court stated:
[Tihe individual has certain fundamental rights which must be respected. The
protection of the Constitution extends to all, to those who speak other languages
as well as to those born with English on the tongue. Perhaps it would be highly
advantageous if all had a ready understanding of our ordinary speech, but this
cannot be coerced by methods which conflict with the Constitution-a desirable
end cannot be promoted by prohibited means.
Id. at 401.
121. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
122. See Carlin, Outlawing Tongues: California's English Language Amendment,
COMMONWEAL, Dec. 5, 1986, at 648; Ehrlich, supra note 4, at 117.
123. See supra notes 4 & 122 and accompanying text. The United States does not have an
official language. The Constitution makes no mention of language at all. While the Framers
recognized that the establishment of an official language would have some value as a symbol of
a common bond among the people of a fledgling nation, they questioned the wisdom of
establishing an official language because they wanted to attract immigrants. See Heath,
Language Policies: Patterns of Retention and Maintenance, in MEXICAN-AMERICANS IN
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 259, 266-68 (W. Connor ed. 1985). The Framers believed that

leaving language to individual choice was in keeping with the notions of individual freedom
upon which the country was founded. Id. at 267. This belief was apparent early in the
nineteenth century when some states routinely published state statutes in languages other than
English. Id. The Constitution is silent as to an official language, although the fact that it is
written in English indicates the language's predominance among the Framers. Id. at 268.
124. The English Language Amendment: Hearings on S.J. Re 167 Before the Subcomm.
on the Constitution of the Senate Comm on the Judiciary,98th Cong., 2d Sess. 140-51 (1984)
[hereinafter ELA Hearings].
125. Id. at 152 (statement of Arnold Torres, Executive Director of the League of United
Latin American Citizens).
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gin because the English-only rules in the workplace are a natural
extension and application of the movement. 126 This connection is
especially clear where the official status of the English language is
12 7
used to support English-only rules in the workplace.
1.

THE OFFICIAL LANGUAGE AMENDMENT AND THE "OFFICIAL
ENGLISH" MOVEMENT

As one respected linguist has so aptly noted, "[t]he English language needs official protection about as much as the Boston Celtics
need elevator shoes." 12' Another respected linguist, however, believes
otherwise. Before Senator Samuel Ichiye Hayakawa of California left
office in 1981, he introduced an amendment that would make English
the official language of the United States.12 9 Although he was not
successful in getting the amendment passed, the movement to have
English declared the national language has gathered momentum. 30
Indeed, legislation supporting the official language movement has
been reintroduced in the 99th and 100th Congresses. 31 Moreover,
official status has been mandated for the English language in seventeen states. 32 Similar legislation is being discussed in New York,
which, along with California and Florida, has the greatest number1 of
33
citizens (mostly Hispanics) for whom English is a second language.
126. See Minor, supra note 9, at 1, col. 3.
127. Gutierrez v. Municipal Court, 838 F.2d 1031, 1043 (9th Cir. 1988).
128. Ehrlich, supra note 4, at 120 (quoting Geoffrey D. Nunberg, Linguistics Usage Editor,
American Heritage Dictionary).
129. See infra note 131.
130. At the state level, similar amendments have passed in seventeen states. See infra note
132. Proponents of the English Language Amendment movement (ELA) generally advance
three reasons for its adoption. First, they claim that English is the common bond of the
American people and that this bond is being threatened by encroachment of foreign languages.
See Carlin,supra note 122, at 648. Second, they urge that all language minorities must learn
English if they are going to participate fully in American society. See Will, In Defense of the
Mother Tongue, NEWSWEEK, July 8, 1985, at 78. Finally, they argue that bilingual services
actually discourage language minorities from learning English. See Ehrlich, supra note 4, at
116; An English-Only Crusade, MACLEANS, Oct. 8, 1984, at 8.
131. An English Language Amendment was proposed in both Houses of Congress in 1981,
1983, and 1985. H.R.J. Res. 96, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REc. H167 (1985); S.J. Res.
20, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. Ruc. S468 (1985); H.R.J. Res. 169, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.,
129 CONG. REc. E757-58 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 1983); SJ. Res. 167, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129
CONG. REC. S12643 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1983); S.J. Res. 72, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG.
REc. S3998-99 (1981).
132. The 17 states and the years in which these amendments were passed are: Arizona
(1987); Arkansas (1987); California (1986); Colorado (1988); Florida (1988); Georgia (1986);
Hawaii (1978); Illinois (1969); Indiana (1984); Kentucky (1984); Mississippi (1987); Nebraska
(1920); North Carolina (1987); North Dakota (1987); South Carolina (1987); Tennessee
(1984); and Virginia (1950).
133. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 118.
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Much of the credit for this increased support has gone to U.S. English, a Washington, D.C.-based national organization with three hundred thousand members who believe that the English language is
seriously threatened in many American communities. 34
Despite the defeat of Senator Hayakawa's initial proposal, official
language legislation became effective in California in November 1986
with the passing of Proposition 63.13" Proposition 63, widely accepted
as the prototype of "official English" legislation, declares English the
official language of the state, requires that the state government take
all necessary action to "preserve and enhance" the role of the language, blocks any law that would "diminish or ignore" the role of
English, and establishes a "private right of action" providing citizens
1 36
with the right to sue whenever the law is not being enforced.
Opponents of the legislation charge racism and xenophobia,
asserting that the terms of such legislation are dangerously broad and
present the potential for irreversible damage to a historically multicultural society. 37 They see the legislation as an attempt to emasculate
the growing political power of Hispanics in California, and fear the
loss of bilingual ballots and educational programs, as well as other
vital services. 13 Conversely, U.S. English believes that given the
increasing number of minorities who speak Spanish, America soon
134. According to U.S. English's information kit, it is a national, non-profit, non-partisan
membership organization founded to preserve national unity by protecting the English
language.
135. Proposition 63 was incorporated into California's Constitution. CAL. CONST. art. III,
§ 6.
136. Article III, section 6 provides:
(a) Purpose.
English is the common language of the people of the United States of America and the
State of California. This section is intended to preserve, protect and strengthen the
English language, and not to supersede any of the rights guaranteed to the people by
this Constitution.
(b)...
English is the official language of the State of California.
(c) Enforcement.
The Legislature shall enforce this section by appropriate legislation. The Legislature
and officials of the State of California shall take all steps necessary to insure that the
role of English as the common language of the State of California is preserved and
enhanced. The Legislature shall make no law which diminishes or ignores the role of
English as the common language of the State of California.
(d) ...
Any person who is a resident of or doing any business in the State of California shall
have standing to sue the State of California to enforce this section ....
Id.
137. See ELA Hearings,supra note 124; see also Jimenez, supra note 40, at 35; Echoes of
Nativism, supra note 40, at 483.
138. See Note, "Official English": Federal Limits on Efforts to CurtailBilingual Services in
the States, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1345 (1987).

1990]

ENGLISH-ONL Y RULES

1231

will be facing "an entrenched language ghetto."13' 9 Official English
opponents charge that by establishing an official language, the nation
will be denying basic constitutional rights to citizens who speak any
language other than English.'4 These issues may seriously affect the
enforcement of the free speech amendment.1 4 '
2.

GUTIERREZ: THE AMENDMENT'S FIRST JUDICIAL APPLICATION

The official tree of the State of California is the redwood. 142 Blue
and gold are California's official colors. 4 3 And, since a November
1986 election, English is California's official language.'" It is this last
official pronouncement that the defendant judges in Gutierrez v.
Municipal Court used as a partial defense for their institution of an
English-only personnel rule in their courtroom. 4 5 They contended
that Section 6, added by the voters as a ballot initiative in 1986,
requires the use of English in all official state business. 146 Thus, Hispanic employees are required to communicate in English while at
work. 4 7 Indeed, this is not an unusual interpretation of Section 6,
regardless of the ominous tone such an application imposes. The official language provision in the state constitution has had its effect in
workplaces throughout the state. Notices of English-only rules have
been appearing on employee bulletin boards ever since May 1987,
when voters approved Proposition 63.141 What makes Gutierrez
important is that it was the first court case to address the official lan139. Ehrlich, supra note 4, at 116. While acting as executive director of U.S. English,
Gerda Bikales argued that the legislation is harmless because it would neither make it
mandatory for anyone to learn English nor infringe upon their right to use other languages.
Moreover, according to Bikales, Hispanics are failing to learn English the way past immigrants
have, and this signals a "breakdown in the assimilation process." Id.
140. See generally Marshall, The Question of an Official Language: Language Rights and
the English Language Amendment, 60 INT'L J. Sac. LANGUAGE 8 (1986).
141. Indeed, on February 6, 1990, Paul Rosenblatt, a federal district judge in Phoenix,
Arizona, declared that the state's constitutional amendment making English the language of
all government functions and actions in Arizona is a violation of federally protected free
speech rights. Yniguez v. Mofford, 730 F. Supp. 309 (D. Ariz. 1990). Where Arizona's
amendment prohibits the use of any language other than English by all officers and employees
of all political subdivisions in Arizona while performing their duties, Judge Rosenblatt ruled
that Article XXVIII violates the first amendment to the United States Constitution because it
is substantially overbroad. Id. at 314. The judge criticized the amendment for its potential to
inhibit legislators from talking to their constituents or judges from performing marriages in a
language other than English. Id.
142. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 422 (West 1989).
143. Id.
144. CAL. CONST. art. Ill, § 6.
145. Gutierrez v. Municipal Court, 838 F.2d 1031, 1043 (9th Cir. 1988).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Minor, supra note 9, at 1, col. 3.
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guage issue in this context. 149
In Gutierrez, the Ninth Circuit rejected the defense's argument
that Section 6 completely bars private speech in Spanish among
coworkers during on-duty periods for three basic reasons. First, the
court stated that no interpretation of the measure supported the
defendant judges' intended use. 5 ° Section 6 does not provide that
English must be spoken under the circumstances presented in Gutierrez, nor does it even suggest that such a rule should be the general
policy of the state. 5 ' Further, the court stated that the provision is
primarily a symbolic statement of the importance of preserving the
English language and was not meant to validate discriminatory Eng52
fish-only rules such as the one in question.
Second, the defendant judges argued that Section 6 was intended
to require that all communications occurring at a governmental place
of business be conducted in English. 53 By relying on the arguments
contained in the ballot initiative itself, the defendant judges reasoned
that Section 6 applies to casual intra-employee or supervisoremployee conversation. 54 The court stated, however, that even giving Section 6 the broadest possible construction as set forth in the
ballot initiative materials, 5 5 it disagreed with the defendants' contention. 56 According to the court, the proponents of Section 6 were
drawing a distinction between official communications and private
affairs. 57 Further, most, if not all, of the speech barred in the English-only rule in this case was private, and thus not subject to the
provision. 58 Finally, the court explained that the adoption of a constitutional provision or a state statute does not ipso facto create a
business necessity. 59 A state enactment cannot constitute the business justification for the adoption of a discriminatory rule unless the
state measure itself meets the business necessity test.' 6°
149. Cox, supra note 3, at 17, col. 1.
150. Gutierrez, 838 F.2d at 1043.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 1044.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1044 n.18 (citing Argument in Favor of Proposition 63, California Ballot
Pamphlet 46 (Nov. 4, 1986), "Government must protect English ... by functioning in English
....
.).
155. Id. at 1044.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. The court relied on Dothard v. Rawlison, 433 U.S. 321, 331 n.14 (1977) (A state
statute does not justify the adoption of a discriminatory rule unless the statute itself meets the
business necessity test.).
160. Gutierrez, 838 F.2d at 1044. The court reasoned that if such an interpretation was
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The workplace-as opposed to the classroom or ballot box-has
emerged as the main battleground of the official English movement
according to civil rights attorneys.16 Even where employees may not
actually be discharged for speaking a language other than English, the
rules still have the effect of creating an unpleasant working atmos-

phere for Spanish-speaking employees.' 62 California's adoption of a
constitutional provision declaring English the official language of the
state prompted employers throughout the state mistakenly to interpret Proposition 63 as a license to keep people from using their native

languages. 63 Gutierrez was an important judicial pronouncement on
the role that this provision was to play in the validation of Englishonly rules in the workplace. 16
IV. A

COMPARISON BETWEEN GUTIERREZ AND

GARCIA V. GLOOR
A.

The FactualSetting of Garcia

In Garcia v. Gloor,1 65 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit held that a rule directing a group of bilingual employees
allowed, employers could justify discriminatory regulations by relying on state laws that
encourage or require discriminatory conduct:
For federal law purposes, it is immaterial whether inadequate justifications
directly underlie the actions of a government agency or are incorporated in the
constitution of a state. In either case, if the proffered justifications fail to meet
the business necessity test they are legally insufficient.

Id.
161. Minor, supra note 9, at 1.
162. Id. Associate Counsel Juan Cartagena of New York's Puerto Rican Defense Fund
argued, "[These [English-only] rules create an atmosphere of discrimination. Even if workers
don't get fired for speaking Spanish... they are made to feel inferior while at work." Id.; see
also supra notes 106-07.
163. Minor, supra note 9, at 1.
164. Indeed, the importance of Gutierrez was not lost on members of the English-only
movement, who saw it as reducing the effect of the constitutional amendment they helped pass
in California. When the Supreme Court vacated the Ninth Circuit's decision as moot for the
plaintiff's lack of standing, the U.S. English newsletter was issued quickly afterwards:
Stanley Diamond, Chairman of U.S. English and campaign chairman for the
California initiative declaring English the official language, hailed the Supreme
Court's action as a "great victory for Proposition 63." Diamond said the message
of the Supreme Court's action was to uphold the validity of the constitutional
amendment. Diamond said, "the lower court decision ignored the need to
protect English as our common language. We asked the Supreme Court to
vacate that decision, and that's just what they did. We're so pleased that the
Supreme Court has removed this cloud from Proposition 63."
US Supreme Court Upholds English Language on the Job Rule, U.S. ENGLISH NEWS,Apr.
17, 1989, at 30. But see Yniguez v. Mofford, 730 F. Supp. 309 (D. Ariz. 1990) (where a federal
district judge ruled that the state's constitutional amendment was violative of the first amendment right to free speech in many of its applications).
165. 618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980).
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engaged in sales work to speak English on the job except during
breaks or other free time, or when they were communicating with
Spanish-speaking customers, did not violate Title VII.'6 In Garcia,
many of the store's customers expressed the desire to be assisted by
Spanish-speaking salespeople. 167 Garcia was hired precisely because
he was bilingual.1 6 He was instructed to use English with Englishspeaking customers and Spanish with Spanish-speaking customers. 69
The owner, however, imposed another language rule on Garcia: Even
though three-fourths of the store's workers and customers spoke
Spanish, Garcia and all other Spanish-speaking employees were forbidden from speaking Spanish on the job, unless communicating with
a Spanish-speaking customer. 170 Among the owner's reasons for this
rule was that the English-speaking customers (only one-fourth of the
total population in the area) objected to the Spanish-speaking employees communicating in a language that the English-speaking customers
did not understand.' 7 The Fifth Circuit accepted the employer's
business necessity argument even though similar defenses had been
previously rejected, 172 basing its decision on the mutable-immutable
characteristics rationale. 173
B.

The Mutable-Immutable CharacteristicsRationale

In Garcia,the store employee argued that the English-only rules
denied him, on the basis of his national origin, the privilege of private
conversation in the language with which he felt most comfortable, a
privilege that non-Hispanic employees who preferred to speak English
enjoyed. 74 The Fifth Circuit rejected this claim, stating that national
origin, an immutable characteristic, could not be equated with an
employee's language of preference-a mutable characteristic. 75 In so
166. Id. at 268-69.
167. Id. at 267.
168. Id. at 269.
169. Id. at 266.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 267. Additionally, it should be noted that Garcia's employer was dissatisfied
with Garcia's work for other reasons as well. Id. at 266. In Gutierrez,on the other hand, there
was no evidence of dissatisfaction with the work of any of the Spanish-speaking employees
affected by the rule. Gutierrez v. Municipal Court, 838 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1988).
172. See Hernandez v. Erlenbusch, 368 F. Supp. 752 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (English-only rule at
a tavern was not justified by owner's contention that non-Spanish-speaking customers were
"irritated" by the speaking of the Spanish language.); cf Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways,
Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971) (Customer preference for female stewardesses is an
insufficient justification for refusal to hire men for same jobs.).
173. Garcia,618 F.2d at 269-70.
174. Id. at 268.
175. Id. at 269. The court held that language discrimination did not in and of itself
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holding, the court expanded the mutable-immutable characteristics
rationale that it first articulated in 1975 in Willingham v. Macon Tele7

graph Publishing Co.1'

Willingham was a male seeking a position as a layout artist with
the Macon Telegraph, one of the Georgia town's daily newspapers. 177
The newspaper's company policy required that employees who dealt
with the public be dressed neatly and groomed in accordance with the
standards of the local business community. 7 This policy prohibited
men, but not women, from wearing long hair.'

79

Willingham's shoul-

der-length hair prevented him from being selected for the position.'8'
Willingham sued, claiming he had been discriminated against on the
V 81 Thus, Willingham concerned
basis of sex in violation of Title VII.
"sex-plus" discrimination against a man, not a member of one of the
groups protected by Title VII.'8 2 In an en banc decision, the Fifth
Circuit upheld the employer's policy" 3 without addressing its disparate impact upon a protected class under the rationale of Griggs v.
Duke Power Co.,' 84 which held that even facially neutral employment
practices could still violate Title VII if those practices had a disparate
constitute national origin discrimination. Id. at 270. The court relied upon Espinoza v. Farah
Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86 (1973) (where a policy requiring American citizenship was held not to
be facially discriminatory against Hispanic individuals).
176. 482 F.2d 535 (5th Cit. 1973), rev'd, 507 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1975) (en banc). The
Willingham court outlined the rationale:
Equal employment opportunity may be secured only when employers are barred
from discriminating against employees on the basis of immutable characteristics,
such as race and national origin. Similarly, an employer cannot have one hiring
policy for men and another for women ifthe distinction is based upon some
fundamental right. But a hiring policy that distinguishes on some other ground
is related more closely to the employer's choice of how to run his business
Willingham, 507 F.2d at 1091 (emphasis in original). For a criticism of this rationale, see
Davis, Garcia v. Gloor: Mutable Characteristics Rationale Extended to National Origin Discrimination, 32 MERCER L. REv. 1275 (1981).
177. Willingham, 507 F.2d at 1087-88.
178. Id. at 1088.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publishing Co., 482 F.2d 535 (5th Cir. 1973).
182. "Sex-plus" discrimination refers to discrimination based upon the sex of the employee
in addition to some seemingly neutral hiring criteria, such as the grooming standards imposed
by Macon Telegraph. See also Phillips v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
183. Willingham, 507 F.2d at 1084. The Fifth Circuit upheld the employer's policy, relying
on two D.C. Circuit Court cases: Dodge v. Giant Food, Inc., 488 F.2d 1333 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(Grooming standards may be imposed where they were not within the intent of Congress when
sex was made a prohibited employment criteria.); Fagan v. National Cash Register Co., 481
F.2d 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Grooming codes that provide one standard for women and
another for men are not discriminatory since both sexes have a standard.).
184. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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adverse impact upon groups protected by the Act. 85
In Garcia, the Fifth Circuit applied the mutable-immutable characteristics rationale in the area of national origin discrimination. The
court stated that Congress' intention in passing Title VII was to prohibit discrimination based on characteristics that the employee was
unable to change.18 6 Thus, the court concluded that Title VII does
not apply to employment policies that are not based upon an immutable characteristic or a fundamental right, regardless of such policies'
arbitrary nature. 87 In making its determination as to whether language is a mutable characteristic, the court focused upon Hector Garcia, the individual plaintiff, and emphasized Garcia's own language
capacities. Because Garcia was fluent in English, the court reasoned
that he could have complied easily with the policy, thereby making
language a mutable characteristic."88
The Fifth Circuit's application of the mutable-immutable characteristics rationale in Garcia expands the doctrine considerably by
extending the forms of discrimination to which it can be applied. The
court in Willingham explicitly stated that the rationale was applicable
only to "sex-plus" discrimination. 189 Conversely, the Garcia court
seems to hold that the rationale can be applied to any type of discrimination prohibited by Title VII. Moreover, the Garcia opinion
expands the groups to which the rationale might be applied. Title VII
favors certain groups, 190 but the mutable-immutable characteristics
rationale articulated in Willingham arose in a claim of discrimination
by a person not within one of those groups. As such, the rationale
that emerged from Willingham is not necessarily applicable to a case
dealing with discrimination against an individual who falls within the
protection of Title VII.
The Fifth Circuit should not have used the mutable-immutable
characteristics rationale in analyzing the discrimination alleged in
Garcia. Mutability, or immutability, is not a common denominator in
the prohibited employment characteristics identified in Title VII. For
example, the Garcia court recognized religion as a prohibited employment factor under Title VII even though it is a mutable characteris185. Id. at 431-32.
186. Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 269 (5th Cir. 1980).

The court did point out

exceptions, such as requirements of high school diplomas and policies prohibiting employees
from living in particular areas. Id. at 269 n.6.
187. Id. at 270.
188. Id.
189. Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publishing Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1092 (5th Cir. 1975).

190. See United Steel Workers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (upheld an apprenticeship
program even where the program discriminated against whites).
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tic.191 Given this, the court's use of the rationaleis precarious at
best.19 2 The mutable-immutable characteristics rationale articulated
by the court shows no reasonable distinction between what the court
apparently considers permissible employment criteria based upon
mutable characteristics, such as hair length and language, 93 and prohibited employment criteria based upon other mutable characteristics,
such as high school education and place of residence. Although both
sets of characteristics are mutable, the court failed to provide adequate reasoning as to why some are prohibited and others are not.
The Fifth Circuit's application of this rationale in the case of Garcia
was thus inappropriate.
C.

The Non-English Speaker and the Bilingual Differentiation

In 1971, in Griggs v. Duke Power,194 the Supreme Court held that
even facially neutral employment practices could still violate Title
VII-even where there was no discriminatory intent-if those practices had a disparate adverse impact upon groups protected by the
Act. 95 Thus, while the Fifth Circuit properly stated in Garcia that
Title VII does not prohibit all arbitrary employment practices, 196 it
failed to note that Griggs explicitly prohibits any arbitrary employ197
ment practice that has an adverse impact upon a protected group.
The English-only rule in Garcia was instituted in a south Texas
business where three-fourths of the population serviced was of Mexican origin.' 98 Due to the composition of the clientele, the store
employed bilingual employees.1 99 Naturally, this rule prohibiting the
use of Spanish in intra-employee conversations would most likely be
violated by these bilingual employees who felt more comfortable
speaking Spanish. Thus, the rule obviously would have its greatest
191. Garcia, 618 F.2d at 269.

192. Although the court recognized that the rationale could not be extended to religious
discrimination, it failed to reconcile the discrepancy. Instead, the court simply stated:
"Religion is, of course, a forbidden criterion, even though a matter of individual choice." Id.
at 269 n.6.
193. Id.
194. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).

195. Id. at 431. The Court held that if an employment practice that has the effect of
excluding protected groups cannot be shown to be job related, the practice is forbidden: 'The
Act proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but
discriminatory in operation. The touchstone is business necessity." Id.
196. "[Title VIII does not forbid employers to hire only persons born under a certain sign of
the zodiac or persons having long hair or short hair or no hair at all." Garcia, 618 F.2d at 269.
197. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
198. Garcia, 618 F.2d at 267.
199. Id.
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impact upon a protected group 2 9--persons of Mexican origin.
Although the Griggs Court stated that the only permissible discrimination of this type is that which is business related, 0 1 the Garcia
court upheld the rule without addressing the business necessity of a
practice affecting the personal conversations of a protected groupbilingual employees of Mexican origin.20 2 Instead, the Garcia court
reasoned that there was no disparate impact if the affected employee
could readily observe the rule and nonobservance was a matter of
individual preference. 20 By focusing on Hector Garcia, the named
plaintiff, rather than on the affected group, the Fifth Circuit
attempted to avoid the entire rationale of Griggs.2 °4 In so doing, however, the Garcia court failed to interpret properly the focus that the
Griggs Court mandated in such cases. When faced with a situation
involving disparate adverse impact, the appropriate focus is upon the
affected group, not the individual plaintiff. 20 5 Once the Garcia court
determined that language is indeed "important" to national origin
and self-identification,20 6 the ability of the affected employee to comply voluntarily with the English-only. rule should have been
irrelevant.2 °7
200. It is apparent that the Garcia court was impressed by the substantial number of
Hispanics hired by Gloor Lumber. What was at issue, however, was the impact the
employment policy had in causing a minority employee to be fired. Id at 270. The Fifth
Circuit should not have focused on the hiring practices of Gloor Lumber, but rather on the
employment practice of the rule and its effect on the number of Hispanics fired due to
violations of it.
201. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
202. Instead, the Garcia court relied upon and emphasized the proposition that there was
no disparate impact if the English-only rule was one with which the affected employee could
easily comply, as Mr. Garcia could. Garcia, 618 F.2d at 270.
203. Id at 270, 272. Yet, according to the EEOC Guidelines, an employer still does not
have a right to enforce an English-only rule during non-working hours even in the case of a
bilingual employee. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(a) (1988). "Prohibiting employees at all times, in the
workplace, from speaking their primary language or the language they speak most comfortably,
disadvantages an individual's employment opportunities on the basis of national origin." Id.
(emphasis added).
204. Garcia, 618 F.2d at 270.
205. See Burns v. Thiokol Chem. Corp., 483 F.2d 300, 306 (5th Cir. 1973). The Court in
Griggs did not question whether the named plaintiff readily could have secured a high school
diploma. Rather, it was whether the group to which the plaintiff belonged could easily secure a
high school diploma. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432. To focus on the individual plaintiff is to ignore
the spirit of Griggs, where the goal is to shield protected groups from discriminatory
employment practices. Id. By reversing the focus of Griggs, the Garcia court enabled itself to
dismiss the fact that only persons of a protected minority could violate the policy.
206. The Garcia court stated: "We do not denigrate the importance of a person's language
of preference or other aspects of his national, ethnic or racial self-identification." Garcia,618
F.2d at 270.
207. It should be noted also that there were performance related justifications for the
termination of plaintiff Garcia's employment. Id. at 266.
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Conversely, the Gutierrez court noted that ease of compliance
with the English-only rule at issue had little, if any, relevance. 208 The
rule here, like that in Garcia, was primarily concerned with intraemployee conversation, both work-related and nonwork-related. 2 9
And while there was no contention that the employees' conversations
among themselves in Spanish had any effect on those who used the
courts, the Ninth Circuit stated that the rule was "sweeping in nature
and had a direct effect on the general atmosphere and environment of
the workplace.1 210 Moreover, the court stated that regardless of its
relevance, any ease that individuals may have in complying with the
rule was not a factor that would prevent a finding of disparate
impact. 21 ' The Garcia court did not conduct its analysis of the English-only rule at issue in the proper scope. Its analysis was distorted
as a consequence of its misapplication of employment discrimination
principles. The Gutierrez court's examination, on the other hand, is
more accurate in keeping with the intent of Title VII, as well as with
the goals of the EEOC Guidelines on National Origin Discrimination.
V.

CONCLUSION

People who are denied the right to view the world through their
language and culture are made to feel inferior.21 2 Given this, it is a
tragic reflection of our intolerance that many monolingual Americans
feel threatened by the use of a language they do not understand,21 3
208. Gutierrez v. Municipal Court, 838 F.2d 1031, 1041 (9th Cir. 1988).
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. For examples specifically in the workplace, see supra notes 106-07.
213. Consider the following political comment regarding the movement towards making
English the official language of the United States:
A proposed amendment to the Constitution would declare "the English language
shall be the official language of the United States" and "neither the United States
nor any state shall require... the use in the United States of any language other
than English." It would prohibit governments from mandating multilingual
publications and from establishing bilingual education as a general entitlement.
It would end the pernicious practice of providing bilingual ballots, a practice that
denies the link between citizenship and shared culture ....
Teddy Roosevelt's life was one long Fourth of July, a symphony of fireworks
and flamboyant rhetoric. He embodied the vigor of the nation during the flood
tide of immigration. He said: "We have room for but one language here and
that is the English language, for we intend to see that the crucible turns our
people out as Americans, of American nationality, and not as dwellers in a
polyglot boarding house." American life, with its atomizing emphasis on
individualism, increasingly resembles life in a centrifuge. Bilingualism is a
gratuitous intensification of disintegrative forces. It imprisons immigrants in
their origins and encourages what Jaques Barzun, a supporter of the
constitutional amendment, calls "cultural solipsism."
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and are vehemently opposed to the concept of legal recognition of the
right to use any language other than English.214 Perhaps part of the
failure clearly to recognize language rights in this country-as has
been illustrated in the sphere of the workplace within this Comment-is that monolingual decision makers carry some of these similar predispositions into the legislative and judicial processes. With the
exception of the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Gutierrez, many of those
courts and legislatures that have exhibited a more progressive attitude
towards the recognition of language rights have never completely
articulated or perhaps even understood why the right to maintain
one's primary language would be seen by people as important or even
vital. That this is so poorly understood, even rejected, in our society
is evidenced in the fervent movement to make English the official language of the country, and in the successful passing of amendments
declaring it so in most of the states where such legislation has been
proposed.
Certainly, there are select circumstances where communication
in English in the United States should be required. Allowing airplane
pilots, for example, to communicate with each other and the ground
in any language of choice could be inherently dangerous to person
and property. Traffic signs and emergency communications also
should be made in the majority language to protect persons and property from the immediate risk of harm. Similarly, although not on the
"emergency" level, employers should be free to require their employees to communicate with potential customers in the language of the
customer's choice to facilitate commerce and protect the employer's
property interest in the business. In recognizing this "limited monolingualism," however, society should place the burden on the proponent of the enforced monolingualism to demonstrate that the
potential harm to person or property outweighs the individual right to
expression before imposing the use of the language. 215 "Irritation" by
Will, supra note 130, at 78.
214. See, eg., supra note 4; see also Weiner, TransborderPeoples, in MEXICAN AMERICANS
IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 130, 155 (W. Connor ed. 1985): "[W]ere significant
Mexican-American groups to advocate irredentist-like positions, such as open borders or staterecognized official bilingualism, one should expect to see the growth of nativist sentiments on
the part of many Americans, who would question the loyalty of Mexican-Americans." Id.
215. Anglo-Saxon tradition has considered language choice the responsibility of the
individual. For this reason, the United States has maintained the English custom of not
regulating language officially or of denying personal liberties in language through federal
policies. While there were a few efforts in the colonial and early national periods to establish
an academy of language to formulate policies and standards of language use, the United States
consistently turned down such proposals from both political officials and citizens. Heath,
supra note 123, at 266.
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monolingual customers or other third parties is. an insufficient justification for the imposition of the majority language, especially regarding private conversations.216
The Ninth Circuit's opinion in Gutierrez eloquently articulates
the reasons for the existence of civil rights laws and their prohibition
against national origin discrimination. The court recognized that
national origin is a matter of who one is, not merely a matter of where
one's ancestors lived.217 Certainly, civil rights laws are meant to protect one's economic status from invidious discrimination on the basis
of national origin. But on a more essential level, they are meant to
protect one's sense of self from assault on the basis of national origin,
for an attack on primary language constitutes an attack on one's identity. Given this, the intent and application of English-only rules in
the workplace should be examined in the most skeptical and critical
manner, for what is at stake is fundamental: one's right to be oneself.
AILEEN MARIA UGALDE

216. See Gutierrez v. Municipal Court, 838 F.2d 1031, 1045-46 (9th Cir. 1988); see also
Hernandez v. Erlenbusch, 368 F. Supp. 752 (D.C. Cir. 1973), where a tavern's policy against
the speaking of "foreign" languages at the bar was held to be unlawful racial discrimination
against Mexican-Americans. In dismissing the argument that the English-only rule was
justified because non-Spanish-speaking customers were "irritated" by the speaking of the
Spanish languages, the court stated:
Just as the Constitution forbids banishing blacks to the back of the bus so as not
to arouse the racial animosity of the preferred white passengers, it also forbids
ordering Spanish-speaking patrons to the "back booth or out" to avoid
antagonizing English-speaking beer drinkers.
The lame justification that a discriminatory policy helps preserve the peace
is as unacceptable in barrooms as it was in buses. Catering to prejudice out of
fear of provoking greater prejudice only perpetuates racism. Courts faithful to
the fourteenth amendment will not permit, either by camouflage or cavalier
treatment, equal protection so to be profaned.
Id. at 755-56.
217. Gutierrez, 838 F.2d at 1039. "Although an individual may learn English and become
assimilated into American society, his primary language remains an important link to his
ethnic culture and identity. The primary language not only conveys certain concepts, but is
itself an affirmation of that culture." Id.

